PET “CUSTODY”
Lyman v. Lanser, MA App. Ct (23-P-73) 2024
Summarized by Hannah Flaherty, Law Clerk
In Massachusetts, pets have always been treated as property. Now, in Lyman v. Lanser, the Court is acknowledging specific carve-outs for when pets may continue to be shared between co-owners.
The Plaintiff in Lyman filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against his former romantic partner for specific performance of an oral agreement to equally share possession of their jointly-owned property, a Pomeranian dog named Teddy Bear (Teddy Bear). The parties split in 2021 and for two months, shared possession every other week. In March of 2022, Defendant cut off all communication with Plaintiff and refused to allow him access to Teddy Bear, which led to the filing of this action.
The Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to restore joint ownership of Teddy Bear, which the motion judge issued, requiring the parties to alternate possession of Teddy Bear every two weeks. Defendant then petitioned for relief from the injunction, which was granted, leading the Plaintiff to file this appeal.
On appeal by the Plaintiff, the Court discussed the elements the Plaintiff needed to prove to succeed in his motion for a preliminary injunction: 1) a likelihood of success on the merits; 2) that irreparable harm will result from denial of the injunction; and 3) that, in light of the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff outweighs the potential harm to the defendant in granting the injunction.
A likelihood of success on the merits
The Court acknowledged that domestic animals may be owned as personal property by tenancy in common, and that tenants in common may make an agreement governing their respective rights in personal property. The Court further acknowledged that the agreement to share Teddy Bear on an equal basis might be interpreted to require that possession be shared in a reasonable manner. The Court explained that agreements regarding personal property may be enforced through specific performance if damages would be an inadequate remedy because the character of the property is such that the loss of the contract could not be fairly compensated in damages based on market value. The Court further stated that some types of interests are by their very nature incapable of being valued in money. In addition, the Court noted that the motion judge could reasonably have concluded that a damages remedy for the Defendant’s breach of the sharing agreement would be inadequate to compensate the Plaintiff for loss of his equal possession.
Balance of Harms
The Court also held that the motion judge could reasonably have concluded that the irreparable harm to the Plaintiff outweighed the harm to the Defendant. The Court stated it was a reasonable inference for the motion judge to make that the Plaintiff had an owner’s affection for the animal, which may be considered in determining the appropriate relief. The Court wrote that the Defendant’s inability to show that ordering her to share possession of Teddy Bear would cause her more harm than it would avoid for the Plaintiff was a valid consideration, especially since the Plaintiff was only seeking to possess Teddy Bear on an equal basis, not deprive her of her possession.
Public Interest
Finally, the Court considered the public interest and acknowledged that in continuing to hear disputes between joint pet owners, there is a chance that these types of cases will begin to take up more judicial resources than the courts can afford to use on them. The Court also acknowledged that many other states, when confronted with pet disputes in divorce contexts, have traditionally treated pets as personal property that must be awarded to one spouse or the other. However, the Court then differentiated between those cases and this one, stating that in this case, the judge was not asked to determine whether the parties should share possession in the first place, but merely to enforce the parties’ own pre-existing agreement for shared possession.
